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Abstract: We analyze collusion in two comparable market structures.  In the first market 
structure only one firm is vertically integrated; there is one more independent firm in the 
upstream industry and another independent firm in the downstream industry.  In the second 
market  structure,  there  are  only  two  vertically  integrated  firms  that  can  trade  among 
themselves in the intermediate good market.  The second market structure mimics markets 
like the California gasoline market where firms vertically integrated through refinery, and 
retail markets.  We rank these two market structures in terms of ease of collusion and show 
that  while  under  some  circumstances  collusion  is  not  possible  in  the  market  with  one 
vertically integrated firm, collusion is possible in the market structure with two vertically 
integrated firms.  We conclude that vertical (multimarket) contact facilitates collusion and 
vertical  mergers  suspected  to  lead  to  subsequent  vertical  mergers  in  an  industry  should 
receive higher antitrust scrutiny relative to single isolated vertical mergers.  
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1. Introduction 
California  gasoline  market  is  well known  for  its  higher  than  national  average  prices  and 
mark ups.    Even  after  correcting  for  state specific  legislative  requirements,  such  as  the 
CARB, this fact stands (McAfee, 2006).  Thus, most authors attribute the higher prices and 
margins  to  lack  of  competition  due  to  market  concentration  and  capacity  restrictions 
precluding entry (Wolak, 2004).  In particular, the data have been found to be consistent with 
some firms exercising market power (Borenstein, Bushnell, and Lewis, 2004), even though 
some argued that the situation is consistent with competitive markets (Energy Information 
Administration, 2003).  Indeed, historically, a few vertically integrated oil companies have 
dominated  both  the  refinery  and  retail  levels  in  the  California  gasoline  market.    One 
characteristic of this market is the existence of several integrated companies coupled with 
horizontal concentration at both levels of the industry.  This characteristic raises concerns 
about  the  relative  likelihood  of  coordinated  interaction  especially  in  the  presence  of 
multimarket  interaction  across  upstream  and  downstream  markets.    The  US  Merger 
Guidelines  define  coordinated  effects,  which  is  a  well known  concept  in  merger 
enforcement, as “Co ordinated interaction is comprised of actions by a group of firms that is 
profitable for each of them only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the others. 
This  behavior  includes  tacit  or  express  collusion…”  (see  http:// 
ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/delamano2.pdf).    Not  surprisingly  given  the 
concentration  in  the  California  gasoline  market,  there  is  also  a  concern  for  coordinated 
effects in merger enforcement.  In particular, the Federal Trade Commission has objected to 
several mergers in this particular market based on coordinated effects theories (see FTC, 
2003,  http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oilgas/charts/merger_enforce_actions.pdf).    In  this  paper,  we 
emphasize that there is one aspect of a market such as the gasoline market in California that 
requires  further  attention  than  would  be  given  to  a  standard  concentrated  market  in  a 
horizontal context.  That is, there is the possibility of multimarket interaction of vertically 
integrated firms embedded in a market composed of vertically related levels.  Multimarket 
contact  is  generally  known  to  facilitate  collusion,  but  the  extension  of  this  argument  to 
vertically related levels is not trivial as we demonstrate in this paper.  This paper is also 
relevant to antitrust policy concerning vertical mergers where a vertical merger that may lead   2
to a subsequent one or  a vertical merger that results in higher concentration in both the 
upstream and the downstream markets. 
 
Although  integrated,  the  oil  companies  in  California  regularly  trade  the  refined  gasoline 
among  themselves,  leading  to  differing  market  shares  between  the  refined  gasoline 
(intermediate good) and retail gasoline (final good) markets.  Thus, these companies contact 
and compete with each other in multiple markets (McAfee and Hendricks, 2009), and, as is 
well known, apart from market concentration within a given market, multi market contact in 
general further facilitates tacit collusion by allocating market power across the participants 
according to their relative efficiencies or spheres of influence in the product space (Bernheim 
and Whinston, 1990).  Note, however, that the vertically related nature of refined and retail 
gasoline markets constitutes a special form of multimarket contact, which we call multilevel 
contact,  and  this  type  of  contact  has  never  been  formally  modeled  (McAfee,  2003).    In 
particular, since these markets are inherently (vertically) related, Bernheim and Whinston’s 
(1990) seminal paper, which finds that multimarket contact generally facilitates collusion, 
may not necessarily apply to them, and even if the argument applies, characterization of the 
environment where collusion is facilitated is critical for ensuing antitrust policy.  Although 
vertical mergers have been extensively studied, there are still open questions (see Higgins 
(2009) for an excellent review).  While we point out the California gasoline market as an 
example, our paper applies to any industry with a high concentration of vertically integrated 
firms. 
 
In modeling multilevel collusion, one needs to play simultaneous attention to collusion in all 
the vertically related markets.  As Nocke and White (2007), who study upstream collusion in 
their  paper,  put  it,  “One  would  of  course  like  to  know  how  vertical  integration  might 
facilitate  collusion  between  firms  at  each  level  of  the  vertical  hierarchy;  this  is  an  open 
question…”  In this paper, we consider all levels of the industry, and we provide a model of 
multilevel collusion and collusion in a market structure with a single vertically integrated 
firm.  We show that multilevel collusion facilitates collusion and point out what specifics 
need to be worked out in order to extend the Bernheim and Whinston (1990) result to this 
setting.  Our result, then, suggests a more aggressive push towards vertical divestitures in   3
vertically related levels as part of merger enforcement.  For example, in the case of gasoline 
in  California,  divestiture  of  retail  gasoline  has  been  proposed  by  Wolak  (2004),  who 
conditions  this  on  high  costs  of  concentration  to  consumers.  Our  results  also  support  a 
dynamic  view  of  merger  enforcement  in  that  a  given  vertical  merger  to  be  followed  by 
several others may be disproportionately more harmful then an isolated one or the first one 
(McAfee, 2006).   
 
In the literature, to our knowledge, multimarket collusion in vertically related markets, in 
which there are cost  and demand  based linkages across markets, has not been investigated.  
Modeling multilevel collusion is complicated due to the inherent relationships between the 
markets.    One  challenge  is  the  benchmark  model  to  compare  the  structures  with  several 
vertically integrated firms.  Also, one needs to cover a variety of possibilities especially when 
modeling  deviation,  e.g.,  an  independent  upstream  firm  can  deviate  from  collusion  or  a 
downstream  firm,  simultaneously  or  sequentially.    Notwithstanding  these  challenges  we 
provide  a  reasonable  collusion  model  and  fairly  general  conditions  on  model  parameters 
under which collusion is sustainable only with more than one vertically integrated firm. 
 
Vertical mergers are increasingly found to have anti competitive elements, mostly under the 
umbrella of post Chicago theories.  The “raising rivals’ costs” and “facilitating collusion” 
theories are two strands of this literature.  In this paper, we find results that combine both 
strands of this literature, however our focus is on the latter.  Although the topic of vertical 
mergers may seem to have been exhausted at first sight (see comments of Higgins (2009)), 
the numerosity of possibilities in the vertical structure seems to continuously lead to new 
models  (See  Higgins  (2009),  Nocke  and  White  (2007),  Normann  (forthcoming),  Chen 
(2001),  Ayar  (2008)).    Collusion  in  vertical  settings  is  a  fairly  important  topic  exactly 
because of the subtleties and ad hoc nature of these settings.  Thus, we contribute to the 
multiplicity of these models to shed more light on this important economic and antitrust 
issue. 
 
To obtain our results, we use the repeated games technique and the Cournot model when 
there  is  competition  (such  as  the  punishment  and  deviation  phases).    The  usage  of  the   4
repeated games technique is standard in collusion settings and we also want to make our 
results comparable to those of Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and to the literature that stems 
from that paper.  The usage of Cournot modeling is, first, due to our interest in examining 
this question in a homogeneous market setting in order to model commodity products such as 
gasoline.  Second, the Cournot model is more useful in modeling market power in either the 
upstream or the downstream markets in terms of the margins that it generates as well as some 
of the other relevant aspects of the industry such as intra industry trade, where the Bertrand 
model falls short (see, for example, McAfee and Hendricks, 2009).   Finally, Cournot model 
better approximates conscious parallelism that is one of the main concerns of the antitrust 
authorities (McAfee, 2006).   
 
We first model the case in that there is only one integrated firm and investigate optimal 
collusion.    In  particular,  our  assumption  is  that  the  integrated  firm  can  only  sell  the 
intermediate goods at a price that is equal to the cost of the (less efficient) unintegrated 
upstream  firm.    This  assumption  is  not  critical  for  our  results,  and  the  efficient  firm’s 
leadership replicates the most efficient collusion possible, i.e., where there is no intermediate 
market separating upstream and downstream markets (optimal collusion).   As a result, we 
show that such collusion is not preferred to Cournot competition by the single vertically 
integrated firm, and so this precludes collusion.  We provide the conditions where the only 
integrated firm elects to withdraw from the market a la Ordover, Salop, and Saloner (1990). 
 
Two recent papers that tackle similar issues are discussed next.  First, Nocke and White 
(2007) analyze the effects of vertical integration upstream collusion and they use a two part 
tariff in pricing.  When investigating only upstream collusion Nocke and White (2007) also 
find a similar “punishment” effect, which is overweighed by the “outlets” effect.  Nocke and 
White (2007) also have a section on multiple vertical integrations, which they simply extend 
their findings via comparative statics of the model with one vertical integration.  Second, 
Normann (forthcoming) studies upstream collusion in the same setting as Nocke and White 
(2007) except that he uses linear pricing as we also do.  Normann (forthcoming) however 
uses Bertrand competition which greatly eliminates any strategic involvement of upstream 
firms.  Our paper is different from these two papers in that intermediate market pricing is set   5
by Cournot competition and hence our moving from one vertically integrated to two such 
firms does not have to parallel what would be suggested by running comparative statics on 
the case with one vertically integrated firm. 
 
As  a  result,  we  show  that  under  certain  circumstances  collusion  is  possible  with  two 
integrated  firms  but  not  with  one.    This  establishes  that  multilevel  contact  facilitates 
collusion.  The structure of the paper is as follows:  In the next section, we discuss our model 
and in the third and fourth sections we present our results.  In the final section we conclude 
with a discussion of the policy implications of our results. 
 
2. Model 
In our model there are two vertically related levels, upstream (like refining crude oil) and 
downstream (like retailing gasoline), and correspondingly two markets, the intermediate and 
the final good markets.  There are two firms in each of the upstream and downstream levels.  
We denote the two upstream firms with U1 and U2 and the two downstream firms with D1 
and D2.  To denote a vertically integrated firm formed from the integration of Ui and Di we 
use the notation Ui–Di, i=1,2.  We study collusion possibilities in two different cases based 
on the number of integrated firms, which is denoted by  {1,2} m∈ : 
   
  Case 1:  Single Vertical Integration (m=1) 
  Case 2:  Multilevel Contact (m=2) 
 
The demand for the final good is exogenously given by  f f Q a P = − , where we normalize the 
slope of the demand to unity.  The upstream firms U1 and U2 have asymmetric constant 
marginal costs, which satisfy 0  < 1 2 c c < < a and there are no fixed costs of production (The 
asymmetric cost assumption serves as a tie breaking rule in collusive profit sharing.  Our 
results trivially extend to symmetric marginal costs.).  For simplicity, we assume a fixed 
proportions technology with one to one transformation between the input and the output. 
We use the infinitely repeated games technique and focus on symmetric subgame 
perfect equilibria.  For each case  {1,2} m∈  we proceed in order through collusion, deviation,   6
and punishment stages.  In collusion stages, we assume that collusion is set to yield the 
highest collusive payoff by setting prices to the monopoly price.  We assume that production 
is made by the lowest cost producer when at least one firm is integrated so that joint profits 
are maximized (when no firms are integrated we assume that collusions are independent in 
the upstream and downstream, as opposed to all four firms coming together at the optimal 
collusion.).  We use one consistent sharing rule to divide the optimal collusive profits across 
all cases.  In deviation and punishment stages, we solve Cournot style games, assuming that 
firms’  decision  variables  are  their  production  quantities  and  transactions  between 
independent  firms  always  take  place  through  the  intermediate  goods  market.      In  the 
following sections, we cover our two cases. 
 
3. Collusion Analysis with a Single Vertically Integrated Firm (m =1)   
3.1.  Collusion Stage with a Single Vertically Integrated Firm 
There are only three distinct firms in this case.  The only vertically integrated firm is U1–D1, 
and U2 and D2 operate in the upstream and downstream markets, respectively (the extension 
of the analysis to the case where U2 D2 is the only integrated firm is straightforward.  In that 
case collusion profits for U2 D2 would remain unaltered, however deviation profits would 
decrease.).  In the collusive stage, the low cost firm U1–D1 sells D2 all the intermediate 
goods it needs in exchange for a unit price of 2 c , which is the marginal production cost  2 c  of 
U2.  This assumption is consistent with optimal collusion maximizing joint industry profits.  
With such a low price, we assume that U2, with cost  2 c , is foreclosed from the market during 
collusion.  Finally, U1 D1 splits the downstream monopoly quantity equally with D2, so we 
use the 50 50 production sharing rule.   
The monopoly output to be sold at the downstream market with equal shares is 
computed using the demand curve  f f Q a P = −  and the cost  1 c  (leading to industry profit 
maximization output hence to optimal collusion), which is  1 ( )/2 a c − .  As mentioned earlier, 
each  firm  equally  shares  the  monopoly  output,  i.e.,  1 ( )/4 a c − ,  at  the  monopoly  price 
1 ( )/2 a c + .  Assuming D2 pays  2 c  to U1 D1 for each unit, which U1 D1 produces at a cost 
of  1 c , the implied profits for the three firms are readily computed: 
             
, 1
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 (( )/2 )( )/4 ( )( )/4
col m a c c a c c c a c
= Π = + − − + − −    7
             
, 1
2 0
col m= Π =  
             
, 1
3 1 1 1 2 1 1 (( )/2 )( )/4 ( )( )/4
col m a c c a c c c a c
= Π = + − − − − − , 
 





1 1 2 1 ( ) /8 ( )( )/4 a c a c c c − + − − ,  ПU2




1 1 2 1 ( ) /8 ( )( )/4 a c a c c c − − − −   
 
Once again, to check the participation constraint (individual rationality of participation), we 
compare these collusive profits with profits from Cournot competition where, in theory, both 
U1 D1 and U2 can produce and there is an intermediate market.  There is no individual 
rationality  of  participation  concern  for  U2  because  by  construction  it  is  excluded  from 
collusion.  Indeed, in this case also we show that collusive profits from collusion are lower 
than those in punishment.  We skip the discussion of deviation profits since deviation profits 
do not matter for collusion as explained in the next section on punishment.   
    
3.2.  Punishment Stage with a Single Vertically Integrated Firm (m =1) 
We first establish in Proposition 1 below that in the case of punishment U1 D1, the only 
integrated firm, does not participate in the intermediate good market in equilibrium.  
 
In  the  punishment  phase  of  case  m=1,  the  independent  upstream  firm  U2  produces  the 
intermediate good at a cost of  2 1 c c >  and sells at the intermediate good price  I P  to D2, 
where I P  is determined in the market.  Firm D2 is the only independent downstream firm, and 
it engages in Cournot competition with U1 D1 in the downstream market.  Proposition 1 
shows that in equilibrium firm U1 D1 does not sell inputs to D2 and also establishes the 
impossibility of collusion when  1 m = .   
 
Proposition 1. Assume that in the punishment phase the downstream firms, U1 D1 and D2, 
have to compete a la Cournot among themselves and the intermediate good market remains 
in operation with U2 supplying D2.  If U1 D1 and D2 collude by sharing downstream sales   8
equally and in exchange having D2 pay  2 c to U1 D1, then such collusion is not possible 
because U1 D1’s profits at the punishment stage are higher and it immediately deviates.
  
 
Proof of Proposition 1.
  
To obtain our result, we solve for equilibria of two games and compare U1 D1’s profits (one 
can think of these two different games as a unified game by introducing a first stage where 
U1 D1  decides  which  one  to  play).    In  Game  1,  U1 D1  does  not  participate  in  the 
intermediate goods market, in Game 2 it does.  Then, we use the profits of U1 D1 from 
Game 1 and compare it with the profits of Game 2.  We show below that profits are higher in 
equilibrium when U1 D1 does not participate.     
Below is the setup for Game 1: 
Table 1.  One stage punishment game (Game 1)  with single vertical integration (m=1) 
 




U1 D1  q1 
U2  x2 
D2  q2 
 
This  simultaneous  Cournot  game  is  played  by  U1–D1,  U2,  and  D2,  given  downstream 
demand and an intermediate market.  The equilibrium for Game 1 can be found as follows.  
Profits of the firms from downstream sales are:   
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 ( ) U D U D D U D a q q c q − − − Π = − − −  and  2 1 1 2 2 ( ) D U D D I D a q q P q − Π = − − − .  
Solving for the Cournot quantities 
*
1 1 1 1 ( 2 )/3 U D I q q a c P − = = − + , 
*
2 3 1 ( 2 )/3 D I q q a c P = = + − .  
Now we proceed to solve for  I P  from the equation of  2 D q  because as long as  1 I P c >  the firm 
U1 D1 always purchases the inputs from itself: 
*
1 3 ( 3 )/2 I P a c q = + − .   
Recalling our assumption on one to one transformation, note that 
* *
2 3 q q = , and hence the 
demand for the intermediate goods becomes 
*
1 2 ( 3 )/2 I P a c q = + − .  Firm U2 maximizes its 
profit:  2 2 1 2 2 2 max( ) (( 3 )/2 ) I P c q a c q c q − = + − − . 
   9
The maximizing quantity is 
* *




1 1 2 (5 7 2 )/12 q a c c = − + ,
*
1 2 ( 2 )/4 I P a c c = + + , and 
*
1 2 (5 5 2 )/12 f P a c c = + + . 
 
Note  that  1 I P c > .    Also, 
*
2 f P c >   if  and  only  if  2 1 2 2 1 2 ( ) a c c c c c > − = + − ,  our  earlier 
assumption. Thus, U1 D1’s profit from punishment modeled as Game 1 equals  
* * 2
1 1 1 1 2 ( ) ((5 7 2 )/12)
pun
f P c q a c c π = − = − + .   
Next we move on the Game 2: 
Table 2.  Another one stage punishment game (Game 2)  with single vertical integration 
(m=1) 




U1 D1  xU1 D1,qU1 D1 
U2  xU2 
D2  qD2 
 
Firms U1 D1 and D2 maximize their profit functions with respect to downstream quantities 
(note that we are not solving this game via backward induction, but in two steps) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 max ( ) ( )
U D q U D U D D U D I U D a q q c q P c x
− − − − − Π = − − − + −  
2 2 1 1 2 2 max ( )
D q D U D D I D a q q P q − Π = − − − , which yield  
1 1 1 ( 2 )/3 U D I q a c P − = − + , and  2 1 ( 2 )/3 D I q a c P = + − .  
Since U1 D1 purchases the inputs from itself, only  2 D q  determines the inverse demand for 
firm U2 and firm U1 D1:  1 1 1 2 ( 3( ))/2 I U D U P a c x x − = + − + , 
where  1 1 2 2 U D U D x x q − + = , so U1 D1 and U2 are both selling to D2.  Incorporating this market 
clearing condition to the profit functions of U1 D1 and U2 we have  
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 (( 3( )/2) ) U D U D U U D a c x x c x − − − Π = + − + −  
2 1 1 1 2 2 2 (( 3( )/2) ) D U D U U a c x x c x − Π = + − + −  
 
Maximizing each profit function with respect to quantities, we have   10
1 1 1 2 ( 3 2 )/9 U D x a c c − = − + ,  and  2 1 2 ( 3 4 )/9 U x a c c = + − .  Hence  1 2 ( 3 2 )/6 I P a c c = + + , 
1 1 1 2 (7 9 2 )/18 U D q a c c − = − + ,  2 2 2( )/9 D q a c = − , and  2 1 (7 2 9 )/18 f P a c c = + + .  
Note that  I f P P <  holds since  2 a c > . The profits are,  
 
2 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 (7 2 9 ) /324 ( 2 3 ) /54 U D a c c a c c − Π = + − + + − , 
2
2 2 2( ) /81 D a c Π = −  and  
2
2 2 1 ( 4 3 ) /54 U a c c Π = − + . 
A comparison of equilibrium profits for U1 D1 from Game 1 and Game 2 reveals that Game 
1 profits are higher, i.e. 
2 2 2
1 2 2 1 2 1 ((5 7 2 )/12) (7 2 9 ) /324 ( 2 3 ) /54 a c c a c c a c c − + > + − + + −  
So U1 D1 does not participate in the intermediate good market, and the punishment game is 
Game 1.   Finally, when  2 1 2 a c c > − . 
Collusive  profit  of  U1 D1  =
2 2
1 1 2 1 1 2 ( ) /8 ( )( )/4 ((5 7 2 )/12) a c a c c c a c c − + − − < − + = 
punishment profit of U1 D1.  
So with this sharing rule, collusion is impossible because U1 D1 will defect. ￿ 
 
We  provide  the  intuition  next.    First,  the  equilibrium  final  good  price 
*
1 2 (5 5 2 )/12 f P a c c = + +  applies to all the quantities sold by firm 1, whereas in collusion U1 
D1 was selling some of its goods to D2 at a low price of 2 c  in our setting.  Second, when firm 
1 competes in Cournot fashion with D2, it has a great advantage due to the arising cost 
structure: 2 1 I P c c > > , provided the condition  2 1 2 a c c > − holds.  In collusion, U1 D1 has to 
sacrifice  more  profits.    Thus, 
*
1 2 (5 5 2 )/12 f P a c c = + +   is  “not  too  low”  compared  to  the 
collusive  price.    Third,  obviously,  the  expansion  in  output  of  U1 D1  due  to  Cournot 
competition  with  relatively  high  equilibrium  price  increases  the  profits  of  firm  1  in  this 
“punishment” phase.  Simply put, firm 1 has nothing to gain from such collusion even though 
D2 prefers to collude whenever  2 1 2 a c c < − .   
Next we study the case m = 2, which corresponds to multilevel contact. 
 
4. Multilevel Contact (m=2)   11
In this case there two integrated firms and no others.  These firms are denoted by U1 D1 and 
U2 D2.  There is still an intermediate market in deviation and punishment phases due to the 
cost asymmetry. 
4.1. Collusive Phase (m=2) 
In this case, firms engage in optimal collusion, i.e., maximize industry profits by producing 
the monopoly output corresponding to the lowest cost upstream firm (U1 D1 producing at 
cost  1 c ).  Also, as in the case m=1, all firms make equal sales at the downstream level.  Only 
U1 D1 produces the whole industry output at the upstream level and sells an equal share to 
U2 D2  at  a  side payment  of  2 c .    Since  there  are  two  entities  participation  constraint  is 
equivalent to sustainability of collusion, which we show is the case.  Now we proceed to 
solve the model under collusion.  The collusive profits are the same as in the case m=1 
because we had excluded U2 from collusion in the case of m=1 (but U2 is an active producer 
and Cournot competitor during deviation and punishment phases when m=1 and when m=2). 
, 2 , 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 ( )( 3 2 )/8
col m col m
U D U D a c a c c
= =
− − Π = Π = − − +  
, 2 , 1
2 2 2 1 1 2 ( )( 2 )/8
col m col m
U D D a c a c c
= =
− Π = Π = − + −  
Next we move forward with the analysis of deviation and punishment. 
 
4.2. Deviation Phase (m=2) 
We assume that only one player deviates at a time via hidden production, which is observed 
only after the sales.    The deviation profit for U1 D1 is the same as that in m=1: 
, 2 , 1
1 1 1 1
dev m dev m
U D U D
= =
− − Π = Π = 1 2 1 ( )(9 16 25 )/64 a c a c c − + − . 
On the other hand, the optimal deviation profit for U2 D2 is different because when m=1, D2 
must buy from U2, who is the only source, so U2 charges a higher price than  2 c .  The 
deviation profit for U2 D2 is computed as, (in the Appendix we show a derivation of the 
profit expressions):  
2
1 2 (3 4 ) /64
dev
j a c c Π = + − . 
 
4.3. Punishment Phase (m=2) 
The model in this section is a simultaneous move game where, given downstream demand, 
each integrated firm determines its upstream production level i x  and downstream sales  i q    12
subject to the equilibrium constraint 
*
f i i Q x =∑  (see McAfee and Hendricks, 2009, for a 
similar model).  Total sales equal total production and hence the intermediate market clears.  
  
 




U1 D1  xU1 D1,qU1 D1 
U2 D2  xU2 D2,qU2 D2 
 
 
This punishment model is suitable in many industries, including the oil industry, in which we 
observe spot markets.  Moreover, this assumption helps us to purely abstract from any form 
of limited or partial vertical integration such as contracts.   
      Let  i q   be  downstream  (e.g.  retail)  sales  of  firm  i,  i x   be  upstream  (e.g.  refinery) 
production of firm i, and  I P  be the price of the intermediate good (e.g. refined gasoline). To 
find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium, (we write the problem for general case. To calculate 
the prices and outputs replace n=2 and i=1,2.), we solve the first order conditions for  i q  and 
i x  subject to the equilibrium constraint.  The profit function for firm i is (i=1,2) 
(.) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
c
i f i I i i i i f I i I i i a Q q P q x c x P P q P c x Π = − − − − = − + − ,  
where the profit from the sale of quantity  i q  is added to that obtained from the production 
quantity  i x . The first order necessary conditions lead to 
* *
i f I q a Q P = − −  and 
* ( )/( 1) f I Q n a P n = − + , where n=2. 
           Since 
*
f i i Q x =∑ ,  we  have  ( 1) / I i i P a n x n = − + ∑ ,  (indicating  a  more  inelastic 
demand for the intermediate good).  The profit function for firm i in the Cournot stage can be 
rewritten as, 
* * (.) ( ) ( ) ( )( )/( 1) ( )
c
i f I i I i i I i I I i i i P P q P c x a P x a P n P c x Π = − + − = − − − + + − ∑ ,   13
where we employ that 
* ( )/( 1) i I q a P n = − +  and 
*
f i i P a x = −∑ . Then the profit as a function 
of the upstream quantities is 
2 (.) ( / ) [ ( ) ( 1) ] /
c
i i i i i i i x n n a c n x x n Π = + − − + ∑ ∑ . 
The first order necessary conditions of the profit function provide,  
2








= = ∑ 1 2 (4 2 2 )/7 a c c = − − , 




( 1) ( 2) (( 1) 2)
( 1)(( 1) 2)
i
i
a n n c n n c n n
x
n n
+ + + − − + −
=
+ + −
.                                                                                                      
We  can  now  calculate  the  equilibrium  intermediate  good  price, 
2 ( ( 1) ( 1))/(( 1) 2) I P a n c n n = − + + + − 1 2 ( 3 3 )/7 a c c = + + .   
Thus, the optimal profit level for each player i in the punishment phase is, 
* 2 * * ( / ) [( ) ( 1) / ]
c
i i i X n a c n X n x Π = + − − + , 
where 
* * , i x X are defined as above.  
The profit expression is, 
* * (.) ( ) ( ) ( )( )/( 1) ( )
c
i f I i I i i I i I I i i i P P q P c x a P x a P n P c x Π = − + − = − − − + + − ∑ , where 
*
1 2 (3 2 2 )/7 f P a c c = + + , 
*
1 2 ( 3 3 )/7 I P a c c = + + ,  1 1 2 2 1 2 (2 )/7 U D U D q q a c c − − = = − − , 
1 1 1 2 (6 10 4 )/21 U D x a c c − = − + ,  2 2 1 2 (6 4 10 )/21 U D x a c c − = + − .  
 
Note that efficient firms are net sellers and inefficient firms are net buyers of the intermediate 
good in the punishment phase where Cournot style competition prevails with full multilevel 












, and the difference between 











, which takes either sign. Specifically 
* *
2 2 q x >  and 
* *
1 1 q x <  hold since  2 1 c c > .                                                                                                              
Comparison of the traded amounts:   
, 2 , 2
1 1 1 2 ( )/3 0
pun m pun m q x c c
= = − = − < , then U1 D1 is net seller of intermediate good.  
, 2 , 2
2 2 2 1 ( )/3 0
pun m pun m q x c c
= = − = − > , then U2 D2 is net buyer of intermediate good. 
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4.4. The Possibility of Collusion ( m=2) 
In the previous sections we show that collusion is impossible when m < 2.  In this section, we 
show that collusion is sustainable when m = 2 under the same assumptions and comparable 
structures.    Our  method  at  this  point  onwards  is  fairly  standard.    Since  we  can  readily 
compute the profits from collusion, deviation, and punishment phases for each firm, a cutoff 
discount factor that ensures collusion follows for each firm.  The ultimate discount factor to 
sustain collusion is the maximum of these cutoff discount factors.   
 
Proposition 2.  Collusion is possible when m=2.      
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
In the proof, where we normalize  1 0 c =  and assume that  2 8 a c ≥  for illustrative purposes, but 
these sufficiency conditions can be made much weaker, making the domain of the collusion 
possibility result much larger.  These sufficiency conditions render a discount rate strictly 
between zero and one in the case of full multilevel contact (m=2).  Thus, under very general 
conditions on model parameters, collusion is only sustainable when  2 m =  but not when m < 
2. So under our assumptions two vertically integrated firms are needed for collusion to be 
sustained.   
 
5. Conclusion 
We consider optimal collusion possibilities in a vertically related industry that is composed 
of one upstream and one downstream component.    We compare two cases.  In our first case, 
there is one vertically integrated firm, one independent upstream firm, and one independent 
downstream  firm.    We  show  that  under  equal  collusive  profit  sharing  rule  when  the 
integrated  firm  colludes  with  the  independent  downstream  firm  and  forecloses  the 
independent  upstream  firm,  collusion  is  impossible.    In  our  second  case,  there  are  two 
vertically integrated firms, and all production is done by the lowest cost firm to be consistent 
with optimal collusion as in the first case, and the higher cost firm receives side payments.  
As a result we show that collusion is possible in the second case only.   
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Our results show that the number of vertically integrated firms is a critical decision variable 
for  an  antitrust  authority  in  deciding  whether  to  approve  a  vertical  merger.    The  FTC’s 
actions in the petroleum  industry demonstrate that since 1981 every merger that FTC took 
action upon is accompanied by another one within one year of the action.  In the last decade, 
there were two mergers or attempts in 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2007 and three in 2005.  This 
record  favors  a  dynamic  view  of  mergers,  where  merger  decision  is  considered  as 
strategically made in anticipation of other mergers.  Our current paper provides a model of 
how vertical mergers can be endogenized.   
 
APPE DIX    
  
Deriving profit expressions in Section 4.2  Deviation (m=2).  
The deviation profits for firm 1 are computed as 
* * * *
1 1 1 2 1 1 (.) ( )( / ) ( 1)/ ( )
dev
f f f f a Q z z Q n c Q n n c Q z Π = − − + + − − + , 
where  1 z  is the hidden production level for firm 1.  Profit maximization deviation level is 
solved as 
*




( )[ (1 ) 8 ( 1) (1 3 ) ]
16
dev a c a n c n n c n
n
− + + − − −
Π = . 
Similarly, the deviation profits for other firms ( 1 j ≠ ) become (replace j = 2 and n = 2) 
1 2 1 (.) ( )( ( )/2 ) ( )/2
dev
j f j j j j a Q z z a c n c a c n c z Π = − − + − − − − . 
Profit maximizing hidden production level is  
*
1 [ ( 1) ( 1) 2 ]/4 j j z c n a n nc n = + + − − . 
Then the profit for firm j can be calculated as,  
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 1
2
2 ( ( 1)) (2 ) ( (1 )) 4 ( 2 (1 )) 2 (2 ( 2 (1 )) ( 1))
16
j j j dev
j
c n c n a n c n c c n a n c c n c n
n
− + + + − − + + + − + − + −
Π =   
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
 
First we present the expressions for the cutoffs above which collusion can be sustained.  The 











 . It implies, for firm 1, that   16




( , , , )
d






2 3 2 2
1 1 ( ) (1 )( 3 1) d a c n n n n = − − + + − + ,  
2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 5 4 3 2
2 1 16 ( 2 1) ( ( 2 1)) (7 3 5 1) ( 1) ( 9 2 6 1) d c n n n c n n n n n a n n n n n n = + − + + − − + − − − + + − + +
 
2 2 4 3 2
3 1 2 8 ( 2 1)( 4 ( 1) ( 2 2 2 1)) d c n n n cn n n c n n n n = + − − + − + + − − +   
6 5 4 2 2 2 2
4 1 2 2 ( 1)[ (5 12 5 4 1) 4 ( 4 ( 1) (1 )( 2 1) )] d a n c n n n n n n cn n n c n n n = − + + − + − − − + − + + + −  
and  i i c c =∑ .  
Similarly, collusion will be maintained by firms  1 j ≠ , if and only if, 




( , , , , ) j j
e







1 1 1 (1 )( ( 1) 2 ) ( 2 1) j n c a n nc nc n n e + + − + − + − = , 
2 2 2 3 2 2
2 1 2 1
2 2 5 4 3 2
4 (1 )( 2 (1 ))( 2 1) ( 1)( 3 1)
( 1) ( 9 2 6 1)
j e nc n c c n n n c n n n n
a n n n n n n
− + − + + + − + + + − +
+ − + + − + +
=
 
2 2 2 2 2 3 2 4 3
3 4 [ (3 1)( 2 1) 4 ( 2 1) 8 ( 3 3 1)] j j e n c n n n c n n cc n n n − − + − + + − − + − + =  
3 2 2 2 2
4 1 2
3 6 5 4 2
2 [ ( 1)( 3 1) 2 [2 ( 1)( 2 1)
8 ( 2 1) ( 4 15 4 1)]] j
e a c n n n n n c n n n
cn n n c n n n n n
− + + − − + + −




Collusion by all firms is possible if and only if the actual discount factor is greater than δ
mlc, 
where 1 1 max( , )
mlc
j j δ δ δ > = .  Now Let the difference of the discount factors in multilevel 
contact be  2 1 δ δ   = − . Then for n =2, 
2 2 2
1 1 2 1 2 2
2 2 2
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2
4704( 2 1)(29 186 95 244 4 120 )
(171 271 100 )(171 2054 923 1712 208 960 )
c c a ac c ac c c c
a c c a ac c ac c c c
− + − − + +
  =
− + − + + + −
 . There is 
no further compact representation of this term. To get the sign of this term, normalize the 

















and only if  2 4 a c > , and 
1
2











 if and only if   17
2 2






4704 (29 244 120 )
0
(171 100 )(171 1712 960 )
c
c a ac c
a c a ac c
=
− +
  = >
+ + −
, by using above two inequalities and 
2 8 a c ≥ . Note that whenever   2 8 a c ≥  holds, then 
1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 , , (0,1)
c c c δ δ
= = =   ∈ .    ￿    
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